Mustafa Oguz und Afacan - Info zur Person

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LinkedIn: Mustafa Oguz Afacan – Associate Professor of Economics ...de.linkedin.com › mustafa-oguz-afacan-447b1376

Sehen Sie sich das Profil von Mustafa Oguz Afacan auf LinkedIn an, dem weltweit größten beruflichen Netzwerk. 2 Jobs sind im Profil von Mustafa Oguz Afacan ...

LinkedIn: Mustafa Oguz Afacan - Associate Professor of Economics LinkedIn

En büyük profesyonel topluluk olan LinkedIn'de Mustafa Oguz Afacan adlı kullanıcının profilini görüntüleyin. Mustafa Oguz Afacan adlı kişinin profilinde 3 iş ilanı ...

Mustafa Oguz Afacan | Semantic Scholar

www.semanticscholar.org

Semantic Scholar profile for Mustafa Oguz Afacan, with 11 highly influential citations and 34 scientific research papers.

Mustafa Oguz Afacan | IDEAS/RePEc

ideas.repec.org

Mustafa Oguz Afacan: current contact information and listing of economic research of this author provided by RePEc/IDEAS

Mustafa Oguz Afacan | Department of Economics

economics.stanford.edu

Mustafa Oguz Afacan. Assistant Professor of Economics at Sabanci University. PhD Alumni. Graduation Year Assistant Professor of Economics at Sabanci ...

Essays on Matching Theory - Mustafa Oguz Afacan - Google Books

books.google.de

This dissertation consists of four essays on matching theory. The first two essays, which are presented in Chapters 2 & 3, investigate two different...

College Admissions with Tuition Transfers by Mustafa Oguz Afacan ::...

papers.ssrn.com

We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tui

Assignment Maximization by Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Inácio Bó, Bertan...

papers.ssrn.com

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilit

Sticky Matching in School Choice by Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Zeynel...

papers.ssrn.com

We introduce the notion of sticky-stability in order to accommodate appeal costs in real-life school-choice systems. When appealing is costly, students (or pare

Popular Mechanisms by Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Inácio Bó :: SSRN

papers.ssrn.com

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distri